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Abstract: Disagreement over what exists is so fundamental that it tends
to hinder or even to block dialogue among disputants. The various con-
troversies between believers and atheists, or realists and nominalists, are
only two kinds of examples. Interested in contributing to the intelligibility
of the debate on ontology, in 1939 Willard van Orman Quine began a se-
ries of works which introduces the notion of ontological commitment and
proposes an allegedly objective criterion to identify the exact conditions
under which a theoretical discourse signals an assumption of existence. I
intend to present the concept of ontological commitment and the Quinean
criterion, to expose and evaluate some of the many criticisms to which the
criterion has subject and to situate it in the context of Quine’s philosophy.
As a product of such analyses, I hope to contribute to the discussion on the
application and relevance of the notion of ontological commitment.
Keywords: ontological commitment, ontology, metaphysics, logic, seman-
tics.
An earlier version of this article was published in Portuguese, in 2014, in the “On-
line Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy”, available at
http://compendioemlinha.letras.ulisboa.pt/compromisso-ontologico-daniel-
durante/
In this English version, a substantive revision was made, and section 5.2 was mostly
rewritten.
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1 Introduction
THE notion of Ontological Commitment came to light in an articleQuine published back in 1939, named “A Logistical Approach to
the Ontological Problem” (hereinafter LAOP). Its opening sentence
questions: “What does it mean to ask, e.g., whether there is such an
entity as roundness?” (Quine, 1966a, 64).
Quine does not ask whether roundness exists or not. He asks
about the meaning of asking about roundness as an entity. Rather
than examining what exists or not, this question invites an appraisal
of what it means to exist, to be an entity. The product of his in-
vestigation, therefore, will not be a catalogue of what exists, but a
construal of what it is to exist, which is the core of a “concept of
existence” and an important part of a broader “doctrine of being”.
To be able to argue for the existence or not of a supposed entity,
such that it becomes possible to overcome the fundamental differ-
ences of opposing views, there is no plausible alternative to adopt-
ing some concept of existence that provides a rational standard for
argument. Without such previous characterization of what it means
to exist, any debate on ontology is reduced to prejudices and arbi-
trariness.
Quine’s inaugural question presages the path of his investiga-
tions. The notion of ontological commitment, which he is to intro-
duce, establishes two preconditions for ontological debates, to wit,
the stipulation of a concept of existence, and the requirement of co-
herence with that concern. No matter how one understands what it
is to exist, under Quine’s preconditions all suppositions of existence
made in an ontological debate can only be ascribed when they are
ontological commitments given by the previously assumed concept
of existence. The notion of ontological commitment is, therefore, a
vindication of rationality.
In LAOP’s second line, Quine proceeds:
Note that we can use the word ‘roundness’ without acknowl-
edging any such entity. We can maintain that the word is syn-
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categorematic, like prepositions, conjunctions, articles, com-
mas, etc.: that though it occurs as an essential part of var-
ious meaningful sentences it is not a name of anything. To
ask whether there is such an entity as roundness is thus not to
question the meaningfulness of ‘roundness’; it amounts rather
to asking whether this word is a name or a syncategorematic
expression. (Quine, 1966a, 64) (emphasis mine) 1
Here Quine chooses one of two different ways of understanding the
question about the existence of roundness. In so doing he coun-
terposes two distinct concepts of existence. The doctrine he rejects
associates being with meaningfulness, the one he endorses, with ref-
erence.
We should not let the linguistic way in which Quine poses the
alternatives to obscure the radical difference between these two con-
cepts of existence. Relating being with significance or meaningful-
ness, for instance, seems a good way of connecting with idealistic
or phenomenalistic conceptions of existence, or even with a defla-
tionism regarding ontology itself. Relating being with reference, by
contrast, seems a plausible path toward ontological realism.
Each one of these two concepts of existence demands a partic-
ular specification of what are the ontological commitments of the
sentences we endorse.2 Consider the statement:
Pebbles have roundness. (1)
1 As used by scholastic logicians the adjective ‘syncategorematic’ was applied to
words that could not stand for any Aristotelian category, having no self-sufficiency,
but acquiring meaning only in connection with other terms to form a proposition.
Since they were not linked to categories, syncategorematic words would have no
metaphysical or ontological weight.
2 Strictly speaking, the bearers of ontological commitments are sentences or theo-
ries. Which of these two options is the best is a subject that will be addressed below.
In a broader sense, however, we can also refer to the ontological commitments of
discourses or even people. A discourse will have the ontological commitments of
the sentences and theories that compose it and people, in turn, assume the onto-
logical commitments of the discourses, theories and sentences they accept.
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The word ‘roundness’ is here a meaningful term of a meaningful sen-
tence. According to the doctrine which associates being with signifi-
cance, it is plausible to impute the supposition that roundness exists
to this sentence and to anyone who endorses it. On the one hand,
if meaningfulness assures existence, then sentence (1) expresses an
ontological commitment with roundness.3 On the other hand, ac-
cording to Quine’s preferred doctrine, which relates being with ref-
erence, it is only legitimate to impute the supposition that roundness
exists to this sentence if the word ‘roundness’ works there as a ve-
hicle for reference (a role usually occupied by names) and not only
as a syncategorematic expression which, though contributing to the
meaning of the sentence, does not name anything.
Two fundamental questions arise. First of all, why should we
favour reference over meaningfulness when questioning what it
means to exist? Secondly, within the doctrine of reference, what
are the grounds for deciding when a term is a legitimate vehicle for
reference?
Dealing with these two questions will be a recurring task for
Quine in the thirty years following the publication of LAOP. The first
and more general one is ignored by him at this initial moment. His
preference for the doctrine of reference will only be justified by his
most general philosophical conceptions: his naturalism; his rejection
of the notions of analyticity, synonymy and other intensional no-
tions; his principle of ontological parsimony, guided by adhesion to
Ockham’s razor, and his standards of ontological admissibility, based
on criteria of individuation provided by the logical laws of identity.
Quine’s answer to the second question, about the grounds of de-
ciding wheter a term is a legitimate vehicle for reference, will be
given precisely by his criterion of ontological commitment, together
with his conceptions of regimentation, paraphrase and ontological
reduction.
3 There is an example of explicit support to the theory of meaningfulness in John
Searle (1969, 104).
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To summarise this introduction, we could say that the notion of
ontological commitment represents the recognition that imputation
of supposition of existence to discourses is only legitimate when at-
tached to some conception of existence previously taken, while the
notion of a criterion of ontological commitment clarifies this attach-
ment. Once fixed to a concept of existence, the criterion establishes
which elements of discourses testify some determinate supposition
of existence. In Quine’s proposal, the concept of existence is tanta-
mount to a referential doctrine of being and the elements which tes-
tify supposition of existence will be those that behave as legitimate
vehicles of reference. 4
In what follows, Section Two presents the methodological
choices that led Quine to his formulation of the criterion of onto-
logical commitment, which is given in Section Three, together with
an equivalent alternative formulation. Sections Four through Six in-
volve analysis, interpretation and evaluation of Quine’s criterion and
the notion of ontological commitment. Section Four demonstrates,
contrary to Quine’s own belief, the intensional nature of ontologi-
cal commitment, and Section Five presents some objections and an-
swers. The main purpose of this section is not to attack or defend
Quine’s criterion, but rather to use attacks on it and responses to
these to deepen understanding of the criterion and its implications
for multiple philosophical issues. Finally, in Section Six, the notion
of ontological commitment is put into perspective with other gen-
eral aspects of Quine’s philosophy. Clarifications developed in the
previous sections are used not only to defend the unity and coher-
ence of the philosophical view that Quine sustained until the end
4 I do not think these few words have clarified what I am calling the referential
doctrine of being. This clarification would involve many aspects beyond the pur-
poses of this article. A commendable introduction to these more general Quinean
metaontological questions is Peter Van Inwagen (2009). To our purposes here, it is
enough to realise that there is more than one distinct mode to conceive the way in
which existence shows itself up in the language and that for Quine this way is not
reachable through meaning, but through reference.
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of the 1960s, but also to point out the impossibility of its complete
achievement.
2 Quine’s path to the criterion’s formulation
In the second paragraph of LAOP, Quine introduces his decisive
hunch:
Ontological questions can be transformed, in this superficial
way, into linguistic questions regarding the boundary between
names and syncategorematic expressions. Now where, in fact,
does this boundary fall? The answer is to be found, I think, by
turning our attention to variables. (Quine, 1966a, 64) (empha-
sis mine)
The formulation of the ontological commitment criterion will require
Quine to clarify under what conditions a term is a legitimate name,
and therefore a vehicle for reference and existence, and under what
conditions it only contributes to the overall meaning of the sentence.
Quine understands that he cannot entrust this task to gram-
mar. The “names” he seeks are not the grammatical nouns. If so,
there would not be much difference between the doctrines of refer-
ence and significance, since most of the verbs, adjectives, adverbs
to which we attach some meaning can easily be transformed into
nouns. In his own example, the word ‘roundness’, is a noun obtained
from the adjective ‘round’. Besides, there is the opposite problem of
many expressions which are grammatical nouns, but have no ordi-
nary reference, such as ‘Pegasus’, or ‘the typical Brazilian’.
Furthermore, to produce an inventory of the possible nouns of a
language and to impute to them the supposition of existence could,
at most, give us a roll of what there can be for the speakers of that
language. This list, however, was never Quine’s intention, and it
wouldn’t help to answer his inaugural question, which wasn’t to
know if roundness exists or not, but to find out what it means to
ask if roundness exists. The title of his most famous article on this
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topic, published in 1948, isn’t “What there is”, but “On what there
is”(Quine, 1963d). Therefore, the answer his criterion of ontological
commitment can give will not be a catalogue of what there is, but it
will be a step towards the clarification of what it means to exist.
In a rework of LAOP published at the end of that same year of
1939, under the title “Designation and Existence”, Quine gives the
clearest description of what had motivated him in the formulation of
his criterion: 5
Perhaps we can reach no absolute decision as to which words
have designata and which have none, but at least we can say
whether or not a given pattern of linguistic behaviour con-
strues a word W as having a designatum. This is decided by
judging whether existential generalization with respect to W is
accepted as a valid form of inference. (Quine, 1939, 706) (em-
phasis mine)
Quine clarifies that the pattern of linguistic behaviour that construes
a word as a vehicle for reference will not be grammatical, but logical.
Not all grammatical nouns lead to what exists, only do that those to
which an application of the existential generalisation logical rule is
accepted as valid. 6
When I say:
5 Unlike LAOP, which was republished in “The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays”,
the article “Designation and Existence” does not appear in Quine’s famous Col-
lected Works. I owe my awareness of this article and this very quote to Oswaldo
Chateaubriand (1971).
6 In a strict sense, the rule of existential generalisation is the logical rule that
authorises an inference of a general affirmation of existence (there are F s) from
a sentence that predicates something of an individual (a is an F ). In symbols:
F(a) ⊢ ∃x F(x). In a broader sense, as it is used by Quine in the above quotation,
to say that existential generalisation is accepted as a valid inference with respect
to a word ‘W’ equals to consider ‘W’ as a legitimate name. That is, a name that
designates something, which has a reference. Therefore, a formal application of
the existential generalisation rule of the type G(w) ⊢ ∃xG(x) would be a valid ap-
plication.
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This coin and that pizza have roundness. (2)
It seems clear that I would accept as valid an application of existen-
tial generalisation that would lead to:
This coin exists. (3)
That pizza exists. (4)
It is not clear, however, if I would accept as valid an application of
existential generalisation that would lead from (2) to:
Roundness exists. (5)
For even though ‘roundness’ is a name in (2), I could have said what
I meant by (2) through the sentence:
This coin and that pizza are round. (6)
But I cannot infer (5) from (6) by existential generalization, since
‘round’ is not a name, but an adjective that in (6) functions as a
predicate nominative.
It seems we go back to square one. After all, we can, as we wish,
accept or not as valid an application of existential generalisation on
‘roundness’ depending on whether we attach ourselves to the form
(2) or we allow the form (6).
Some issues, however, need to be clarified. We again must re-
member that the purpose of Quine’s criterion has never been to de-
cide whether roundness or any other supposed entity exists or not,
but only to indicate the exact circumstances in which, according to
the referential doctrine of being, we can impute to discourses (and
its holders) a particular assumption of existence.
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The appeal to the existential generalisation rule indicates Quine’s
preferences for his criterion. Natural language, with all its subtleties
and different ways of expression, is not the adequate environment
to judge if an application of the existential generalisation rule is ac-
cepted as valid or not. A more auspicious entourage to do that will
be the language of first-order classical logic, with the additional re-
strictions Quine imposes on it: the elimination of names (individual
constants) and the Russellian way of formalising descriptions. It is in
this strict canonical notation that, according to Quine, we will finally
be able objectively to verify suppositions of existence. 7
In the austere ambience of canonical notation there are no dis-
courses, but formalised sentences and theories; there are no names,
but variables and quantifiers; there are no properties or relations,
but limited sets of pre-established symbols of predicate and relation
that constitute the non-logical vocabularies of each formalised the-
ory. Quine’s criterion is formulated by focusing on the formalised
theories in this canonical notation. Its application to general dis-
courses thus is only indirect. It requires the intermediate step of
formal regimentation.
More than forty years after LAOP, in “Things and Their Place
in Theories”, of 1981, Quine justifies formal regimentation in the
following terms:
The idea of a boundary between being and nonbeing is a philo-
sophical idea, an idea of technical science in a broad sense.
Scientists and philosophers seek a comprehensive system of
the world, and one that is oriented to reference even more
squarely and utterly than ordinary language. Ontological con-
cern is not a correction of a lay thought and practice; it is
7 A first-order language includes among its non-logical symbols individual con-
stants, which are the formal counterparts of the names. In his 1939 articles,
Quine still accounted individual constants in his canonical notation. Yet, in “On
What There Is”, he expanded the theory of definite descriptions of Bertrand Rus-
sell (1905) to reach names also, and promoted through this a complete elimination
of individual constants from canonical notation (Quine, 1963d, 7–8). See Daniel
Durante (2011, 34).
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foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth of it. (Quine,
1981b, 9)
In order to evaluate the ontological commitments of a discourse, we
first need to regiment it in the canonical notation. Then we need
to specify an interpretation for the non-logical symbols, of predicate
and relation, and to treat the regimented version as a theory, that
means, to add to the explicitly declared sentences (the axioms of
the theory) all its logical consequences. As there are no names in
the canonical notation, the only vehicles for reference and therefore
for existence are variables. And mathematicians usually say that the
reference of a variable is its value.
3 “To be is to be the value of a variable”
We have finally reached the point of making sense of both, the state-
ment of Quine’s ontological commitment criterion and his famous
slogan about being. And we already find a first expression of both in
1939, right on the third page of LAOP.
We may be said to countenance such and such an entity if and
only if we regard the range of our variables as including such
an entity. To be is to be a value of a variable. (Quine, 1966a,
66)8
Quine’s slogan is nothing more than the statement of the concept of
existence he favours, the referential doctrine of being, in conjunc-
tion with the conception that the variables of canonical notation are
the only unequivocal and legitimate vehicle for reference. Quine’s
criterion, in turn, is only an immediate consequence of that: if to be
8 Quine later changed the expression “a value” to “the value”. Thereby the definitive
version of his slogan became “to be is to be the value of a variable” (Quine, 1963d,
15). Many authors, as João Branquinho (2006, 152), add the adjective “bound” to
the term “variable” and present the slogan as: “to be is to be the value of a bound
variable”. Both versions are equivalent by reasons which will be made clear in this
section.
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is to be the value of a variable, then we are ontologically commit-
ted to the existence of everything we count among the values of our
variables.
So defined, the slogan still requires explanation. What are the
means available to identify in the canonical notation the values of
the variables of a regimented theory? Another formulation of the
criterion presented in one of the last papers Quine devoted to this
theme, “Existence and Quantification” first published in 1968, clari-
fies the issue better:
To show that a theory assumes a given object, or objects of a
given class, we have to show that the theory would be false if
that object did not exist, or if that class were empty. (Quine,
1969a, 93)
Then a theory ontologically commits itself to something when the
theory would be false if that thing didn’t exist and were not among
the values of the theoretical variables. Consider the following canon-
ically regimented sentences:
∃xGhost(x) − (There are ghosts) (7)
∀y (Ghost(y)→ Diaphanous(y)) − (Ghosts are diaphanous) (8)
When will (7) be false? It will be false when none of the possible
values for the variable x is a ghost. If in the range of x there is no
ghost, then (7) is false. So, if the class of ghosts is empty, (7) is
false and, therefore, (7) and any theory of which (7) is one of its
sentences ontologically commits itself to ghosts.
What about (8), when will it be false? It only will be false if,
among the range of y’s values there is at least one which is a ghost
but not diaphanous. If none of the values of y is a ghost, the formal
semantic rules assure that (8) is true. After all, (8) does not state
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that there are ghosts. It only states of anything that if it is a ghost,
then it is diaphanous. Hence, unlike (7), (8) does not ontologically
commit itself to ghosts, because there need be no ghosts for (8) to
be true.
The resort of regimentation in canonical notation and the appeal
to semantic rules that explain the truth conditions of formalised sen-
tences help us to perceive that we can use the word ‘ghost’ in mean-
ingful and possibly true sentences, as (8), without any commitment
to the existence of ghosts. These examples, I believe, help to clarify
not only the importance of the notion of ontological commitment for
the ontological debate but also the foundations of Quine’s criterion.
Another advantage given by regimentation is that semantic rules,
which establish the truth conditions of sentences, and logical rules,
which settle its logical consequences, are so strongly related that
one can prove that a theory T requires an entity of type P among
the values of its variables if and only if ‘∃x P(x)’ is one of the logical
consequences of T. In other words, to say that T would be false
if the class P were empty is the same as to say that ‘∃x P(x)’ is one
of the logical consequences of T. Then, given that a theory onto-
logically commits itself to what would make it false if it were not
among the values of its variables, we could propose the following
alternative formulation for Quine’s criterion:
T ontologically commits itself to Ps ⇐⇒ T  ∃x P(x) 9
9 Though overly formal details have been avoided, some clarifications are needed to
avert misunderstandings: (1) The expression ‘theory T’ is being used ambiguously
to express both a set of axioms of T as well as its deductive closure, that is, the
collection of T’s axioms plus all its logical consequences. (2) To formalise a theory
in canonical notation, one uses a non-logical vocabulary, a set of predicate and rela-
tion symbols that are part of the theory’s sentences. Then in ‘∃x P(x)’, for instance,
‘P’ is a predicate symbol of the theory’s vocabulary. Fonts sans serif are being used
for symbols of canonical notation; which can be upper case letters (as ‘G’) as much
as words beginning with upper case letters (as ‘Ghost’). (3) A theory T is inter-
preted in the sense used by Quine when for each predicate symbol ‘P’ and relation
symbol ‘R’ from its vocabulary there is an accepted criterion to judge from which
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That means that the theory T ontologically commits itself to entities
of type P if and only if ‘∃x P(x)’ is one of the logical consequences
of T. Thus, to know the ontological commitments of any theory
T, it is enough to examine its existential affirmations; both the ex-
plicitly stated ones, T’s axioms, as much as those that are logical
consequences of them.
Slightly altered versions of this formulation have been repeatedly
suggested in the literature by Richard Cartwright (1954), Alonzo
Church (1958), Chateaubriand (1971), Mark Richard (1998),
Agustín Rayo (2007) and Michaelis Michael (2008), among others.
Quine has, however, always preferred to formulate his criterion in
more directly semantic terms. Nevertheless, his agreement to this
alternative formulation can be attested in some passages.
Existence is what existential quantification expresses. There
are things of kind F if and only if ∃x F(x). This is as unhelpful
as it is undebatable. (Quine, 1969a, 97)
things (entities) one considers true to say they are Ps and from which sequence
of things one considers true to say they are related according to R. Then, to each
predicate symbol ‘P’ from the vocabulary of a theoryT, an interpretation associates
an extension given by the class of things regarded to be of P kind, that means, the
extension of ‘P’ is the class given by the values of ‘x’ to which the interpretation
considers ‘P(x)’ is true. For instance, to the predicate symbol ‘Blue’ an orthodox
interpretation associates the class of blue things as its extension. (4) There are two
possible readings to expressions ‘class P ’, ‘entities of type P ’ and ‘Ps’, as they are
being used. In an extensional rendering, what has been called ‘class P ’ corresponds
exactly to this extension associated with ‘P’ by a predefined interpretation. In this
case, the ‘entities of type P ’ or simply the ‘Ps’ are the elements of this extension, the
entities (values of ‘x’) to which the predefined interpretation considers the predica-
tion P(x) to be true. In an intensional reading, otherwise, ‘class P ’, ‘type P ’ or just
‘P ’ refer to the proper concept (or characteristic function) which defines the exten-
sion of the predicate ‘P’ by the predefined interpretation. I do not intend to resolve
this ambiguity for reasons that will be clear in the next section. (5) The symbol ‘’
corresponds to logical consequence. As we are in the scope of first-order classical
logic in which the completeness theorem holds, an alternative equivalent formu-
lation to finitely axiomtizable theories can be obtained substituting ‘⊢’ (deductive
consequence) for ‘’.
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Now, if there are things of the type F if and only if ∃x F(x), then
the theory T assumes things of type F (ontologically commits itself
to F s) if and only if T  ∃x F(x), that is, if ‘∃x F(x)’ is one of the
affirmations of T.
This alternative formulation takes us back to “Designation and
Existence”, where Quine pointed out, in the rule of existential gen-
eralisation, the linguistic behaviour that signals a commitment to
existence. It also highlights what may be Quine’s most influential
contribution to contemporary ontology: the metaontological concep-
tion that existence is inseparable from quantification. Any doctrine
about being requires and binds to a particular theory of quantifica-
tion. Therefore different theories of quantification reflect different
concepts of existence.
Classical quantification theory enjoys an extraordinary combi-
nation of depth and simplicity, beauty and utility. [...] Devia-
tions from it are likely, in contrast, to look rather arbitrary. But
insofar as they exist it seems clearest and simplest to say that
deviant concepts of existence exist along with them. (Quine,
1969a, 112–113)
This link between existence and quantification is a legacy of Quine
that is present on almost every flank of the contemporary ontolog-
ical debate, incorporated as a methodological element accepted by
philosophers with the most divergent views on ontology and meta-
physics.10
10 As Branquinho (2012) points out, we can go back a little further and assign to
Frege and Russell the origins of this linkage between existence and quantification.
It was, however, Quine and his notion of ontological commitment that gave it its
more mature expression. In David Chalmers et al. (2009), which is a collection of
articles, there are good examples of how the link between existence and quantifica-
tion is used and accepted by proponents of widely divergent positions on ontology
and metaphysics. Although among these articles there are examples of disagree-
ment with this thesis, as in Kit Fine’s “The question of ontology”, whose influential
position has produced a new growing movement away from the Quinean thesis
linking existence and quantification. In this regard see, for instance, Tuomas Tahko
(2015) and Berto and Plebani (2015).
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4 Ontological commitment and intensionality
The distinction between the extension and the intension of a pred-
icate was already known by the medievals, and its origins go back
to Aristotle. The extension of a predicate is composed of the things
of which it is true, and its intension is roughly connected with its
meaning. The extension of the predicate ‘courageous’, for instance,
are the brave individuals, and its intension corresponds to what en-
ables us to distinguish courageous individuals from those who are
not. Intensions and extensions do not always go together. The pred-
icates ‘being a rational animal’ and ‘being an animal with opposing
thumb’ clearly have distinct meanings: what enables us to identify
whether or not an animal is rational is clearly different from that
which allows us to determine whether or not it has an opposing
thumb. Therefore even though these two predicates have the same
extension, for being true of exactly the same individuals, they have
different intensions.
Just as traditional mathematics and set theory are exclusively ex-
tensional disciplines, Quine believed that the same could be obtained
in general theoretical discourse. He believed that we could do sci-
ence and philosophy without the need of dealing with intensions,
meanings, and related notions. What is more, he considered these
as problematic notions and strove to exclude them altogether from
his philosophical project. In “Ontology and Ideology”, from 1951, he
wrote:
[A] fundamental cleavage needs to be observed between two
parts of so-called semantics: the theory of reference and the
theory of meaning. The theory of reference treats of naming,
denotation, extension, coextensiveness, values of variables,
truth; the theory of meaning treats of synonymy, analyticity,
syntheticity, entailment, intension. Now the question of the on-
tology of a theory is a question purely of the theory of reference.
The question of the ideology of a theory, on the other hand,
obviously tends to fall within the theory of meaning; and, in-
sofar, it is heir to the miserable conditions, the virtual lack of
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scientific conceptualization, which characterize the theory of
meaning. (Quine, 1951, 15) (emphasis mine)
The theory of reference is thus the part of semantics for which the ex-
tensional notions are enough, which dispenses with considerations
about the intensions of linguistic expressions. The theory of mean-
ing, in turn, is the part of semantics whose understanding extrapo-
lates reference and extension and requires the notions of intension,
meaning, and analyticity, which Quine vehemently rejects as confus-
ing and obscure. In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, from 1951, per-
haps his most famous article, Quine (1963e) presents an eloquent
critique of the notions of analyticity and synonymy, well according
to this zest for rejecting intensional notions.
In one of the earliest critical reactions to Quine’s ontological com-
mitment criterion, Cartwright (1954) contests the above-highlighted
statement, which places questions about the ontology of a theory ex-
clusively within the theory of reference’s scope. In examining the for-
mulations of the criterion, Cartwright noted that they employ terms
that Quine associates with the theory of meaning.
Among the more than a dozen formulations Quine presented for
his criterion, all catalogued by Chateaubriand (1971), we can choose
the following as perhaps the most representative:
[E]ntities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only
if some of them must be counted among the values of the vari-
ables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be
true. (Quine, 1963b, 103) (emphasis mine)
To say that entities must be the values of certain variables is the
same as saying that it is necessary for them to be such values, and
according to Cartwright (1954, 319), the term ‘necessary’ is as good
a candidate for the meaning theory as the terms ‘analytical’ and ‘en-
tailment’ are. Also, our alternative formulation does not escape the
problem since it is not explicit about how we should interpret the ex-
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pression ‘Ps’ in “T ontologically commit itself with Ps”. 11 Besides, it
explicitly employs the notion of logical consequence ‘’, whose char-
acterization as belonging to the theory of meaning or reference is at
least controversial (Etchemendy, 1990).
Most contemporary philosophers do not share Quine’s suspicions
against the theory of meaning and therefore do not consider the sup-
posed intensional character of ontological commitment as a prob-
lem. Yet, being accused of disrespecting one’s own standards is one
of the worst philosophical faults. One possible way of bringing Quine
out of this embarrassment would be to present an extensional in-
terpretation of the criterion which did not need for its formulation
any intensional notion related to the theory of meaning. Unfortu-
nately, this possibility has not been realised. Cartwright (1954), Is-
rael Scheffler and Noam Chomsky (1958), Terence Parsons (1967),
Michael Jubien (1972), Chateaubriand (2003), among others, have
shown that the intelligibility of the notion of ontological commit-
ment is incompatible with any extensional interpretation.
The notions of intension and extension, earlier related with pred-
icates, can also be defined as applying to other linguistic expressions.
Just as the extension of a predicate are the objects of which it is true,
the extension of a 𝑛-ary relation (or an open sentence with 𝑛 free
variables) are the sequences of 𝑛 objects to which the relation (or
sentence) is true. The extension of a singular term is its reference,
the object it denotes, and the extension of a (closed) sentence is its
truth value. Two expressions (predicates, relations, open sentences,
individual terms or closed sentences) will be co-extensive if they have
the same extension (Hylton, 2007).
These definitions provide a fairly objective test of whether the in-
terpretation of certain expressions may be restricted to their exten-
sions, which is called an extensional context, or whether the intelligi-
bility of what is said requires the incorporation of the intensions of
terms, which is known as an intensional context. The test works like
11 See item (4) of footnote 9.
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this: if substitutions of singular terms, predicates, and relations in a
closed sentence by coextensive singular terms, predicates, and rela-
tions never alter the extension of the sentence itself (its truth value),
then this indicates an extensional context of interpretation. Other-
wise, when substitutions of coextensive expressions can change the
extension of the compound expression, then this shows that the un-
derstanding of what is said requires the use of intensional notions,
which characterises an intensional context.
For example, when we replace ‘Morning Star’ with the co-
referential expression ‘Evening Star’ in the true sentence, “Ancient
astronomers knew that, besides the moon and the sun, the Morning
Star was the last orb to go out of sight in dawn”, we get the false
sentence “Ancient astronomers knew that, besides the moon and the
sun, the Evening Star was the last orb to go out of sight in dawn”.
Then, sentences that deal with knowledge claims do not pass the
extensionality test since the substitution of co-referential terms may
change the sentence’s truth value. This indicates that the intelligibil-
ity of knowledge claims requires an intensional semantic context.
The bases of the test are both, the principle of substitutivity of
identicals and the law of identity of indiscernibles.12 If all that matters
semantically are extensions of expressions, then expressions with the
12 In very general terms, the principle of substitutability of identicals establishes
that identical things can be substituted for each other without provoking any con-
sequence, since being identical, they are in fact the same thing. And the principle of
identity of indiscernibles, also known as Leibniz’s law, states that it is not possible
for two different things to be exactly similar to each other. That is, distinct things
need to be discernible, dissimilar in some respect. Otherwise, they were not dis-
tinct, but the same thing. There is a lot of disagreement about the understanding,
validity and precise formulation of these principles. For our purposes here, given
the semantic context we are in, we can consider that the substitutability of identi-
cals states that two expressions with identical semantic values (sense and reference)
can be substituted for each other in a sentence without this causing the change of
the semantic value (sense and truth value) of the complete sentence. The identity
of the indiscernibles, in its turn, guarantees that if two expressions are semantically
indiscernible, that is, if they affect the semantic value of all sentences in which
they can occur in exactly the same way, then their own semantic values (sense and
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same extension should be semantically indistinguishable, and thus
by the identity of indiscernibles, semantically identical. Then, by the
substitutivity of identicals, they should be substitutable without any
semantical consequence. When this is the case, substitutions of co-
extensive expressions do not change the extension of the compound
expression, which circumstance characterises extensional contexts.
Otherwise, when replacement of coextensive expressions does alter
the extension of the compound expression, this circumstance char-
acterises a situation where expressions with the same extension are
not indiscernibles and thus not semantically identical. Then, their
semantic account requires more than extensions. It also demands
their intensions, which characterises intensional contexts. There is
a clearly pragmatic intuition in the use of the test: where intensions
make no difference, do not alter the truth or falsity of what is said,
we do not need them. They should only be considered part of the
semantic interpretation when required.
Jubien (1972) used the test of substitutability of coextensive ex-
pressions to show that the intelligibility of the concept of ontologi-
cal commitment is incompatible with any extensional interpretation.
Firstly, he proposed to treat an ontological commitment as the sec-
ond term of a binary relation whose first term is an interpreted the-
ory. Thus, to assert that 𝛼 is one of the ontological commitments of
the theory T is equivalent to affirm the following relation:
T assumes 𝛼
The concept of ontological commitment will have an extensional in-
terpretation if all assertions of the kind (T assumes 𝛼) respect the
principle of substitutivity. In this case, if it is true that (T assumes 𝛼)
reference) are identical. Thus defined, these become plausible principles, whose
non-acceptance would undoubtedly require more justification than the acceptance.
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and that 𝛼 and 𝛽 are coextensive, then it must also be true that
(T assumes 𝛽). 13
At this point, a question hitherto avoided imposes itself: what
kind of thing can be an ontological commitment of a theory? When
I say that (T assumes 𝛼), what is it that T assumes? What is the
domain of the 𝛼 variable? The answer that a literal interpretation of
Quine’s criterion gives is that the domain of 𝛼 and of the variables
of the theory T are the same. After all, Quine states that “entities
of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of them
must be counted among the values of [its] variables” (Quine, 1963b,
103).
Consider then the following two theories, each of them with only
one existential affirmation orthodoxly interpreted:
TU : ∃xUnicorn(x) — (There are unicorns)
TC : ∃y Centaur(y) — (There are centaurs)
If ‘assumes ’ is taken as a relation between theories and entities of
the same type as the values of their variables, then, since there are
neither centaurs nor unicorns, there is no entity among the possible
values of ‘x’ and ‘y’ to make true the sentences of TU and TC. There-
fore, according to Quine’s criterion, TU and TC will have no onto-
logical commitment.14 In general, it will not be possible for a theory
13 Jubien’s article is much more detailed than this quick outline which, nevetheless,
respects the general structure of the Jubien’s argument, organised on the analyses
of the relation ‘assumes ’ and on the domain of its second term.
14 Even if one wants to admit the existence of abstract entities that reifies the con-
cepts of centaur and unicorn, the application of predicates ‘Centaur’ and ‘Unicorn’
to these abstract entities will not be true. Admitting the opposite is both coun-
terintuitive and leads to contradictions. It is counterintuitive because if there is,
for example, an abstract entity that is the universal of the colour blue, precisely
because it is abstract this entity has no colour, that is, it is not blue, it does not
satisfy the predicate ‘Blue’. And it leads to contradictions only because we can con-
ceive contradictory properties. If the square roundness universal is round square,
then it is round and not round, and it is also square and not square. Therefore,
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to commit itself ontologically to what does not exist. This conclu-
sion is, however, contrary to any acceptable intuition for the notion
of ontological commitment. As Quine has repeatedly stated, “we
have moved now to the question of checking not on existence, but
on imputations of existence: on what a theory says exists” (Quine,
1969a, 93). But what a theory says exists cannot be held hostage to
what exists. Although there are no centaurs, TC says there are, and
therefore makes ontological commitments.
A first possibility for solving this problem is to construe the re-
lation ‘assumes ’ not between theories and the entities that may be
values of their variables, but between theories and classes of these
entities. Since the empty class is still a class, even if there are no
unicorns the theory TU would have an ontological commitment to
the empty class. The problem now is that there being no centaurs,
the ontological commitments of TC would also come down to the
empty class, and therefore TU, which only states that there are uni-
corns, and TC, which only states that there are centaurs, would
nevertheless have the same ontological commitments, namely, the
empty class. Moreover, if we call 𝛼 the extension of the predicate
‘Unicorn’ (that is, the unicorns’ class) and 𝛽 the extension of ‘Centaur’
(the centaurs’ class), we have:
TU assumes 𝛼
TC assumes 𝛽
If we want to support that the context of the relation ‘assumes ’ is
extensional, then it must pass the test of substitutability. So, since
𝛼 = 𝛽 = ∅, we should be able to replace 𝛼 with 𝛽 in the above state-
ments getting:
if there is some abstract entity that reifies the concept of a unicorn, it is not itself
a unicorn, but an abstract entity which, therefore, does not satisfy the ‘Unicorn’
predicate. Thus, even if the value of x is precisely this entity, Unicorn(x) will be
false and therefore, under the hypothesis that the domain of the second term of
(T assumes 𝛼) is the same as that of the variables of T, TU and TC will not have
any ontological commitment.
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TU assumes 𝛽
TC assumes 𝛼
The principle of substitutability of identicals forces us to accept that
TU, which only states there are unicorns, ontologically commits it-
self to centaurs and TC, which only states there are centaurs, on-
tologically commits itself to unicorns. Reasoning in the same way
we can conclude that TU and TC also are ontologically committed
to Pegasus, Count Dracula, phlogiston, and anything other theories
wrongly claim to exist. In general, under the hypothesis that the sec-
ond term of the relation assumes varies over classes of entities that
may be the values of variables, all theories that affirm the existence
of something that does not exist share some of their ontological com-
mitments. Again, all these conclusions contradict the intuition that
the ontological commitments of a theory should depend exclusively
on what it claims to exist, not on what exists or on what other the-
ories claim to exist. This leads to the conclusion that the relation
‘assumes ’ does not respect the substitutability of identicals, and thus
does not pass the test either when we consider that its second term
varies over classes of entities that may be values of the theory’s vari-
ables.
If ontological commitments can neither be the entities that are
the values of the theories’ variables, nor classes of them, what are
they? Concepts? Ideas? Attributes? Universals? Abstract particu-
lars? Linguistic expressions (terms) that do not designate? Accord-
ing to Jubien (1972, 384), the adoption of any of these candidates
and the “abandoning [of] the idea of a relation between theories and
entities or classes forces us in the direction of intensionality”. After
all, what distinguishes centaurs from unicorns is, precisely, what dif-
ferentiates the ontological commitments of TC and TU. But we have
seen that this distinction lies not in the entities (or their classes),
which are centaurs and unicorns, for which the predicates ‘Centaur’
and ‘Unicorn’ apply. So it seems fair to say that the distinction be-
tween centaurs and unicorns is conceptual, intensional. It is not in
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the things that are centaurs or unicorns but in the concept of being a
centaur or being a unicorn. This is the “direction of intensionality”.
Furthermore, it does not matter our ontological categorization
for this I am calling a concept. We can treat it as something mental,
and insert it within the scope of meanings, ideas, intentions; we can
treat it as a linguistic term which belongs to some formalisation, as
the lambda calculus, or some semantic theory. We can even reify
the concepts of being a centaur and being a unicorn, attaching them
to some sort of abstract entity. All these possibilities are open to ex-
ploitation and may result in quite distinct and interesting approaches
to ontological commitments. All these approaches, however, will be
intensional because none of the candidates for second term of the
relation ‘assumes ’ capable of explaining what differentiates centaurs
from unicorns will respect the principle of substitutability of identi-
cals. Since there are no centaurs and unicorns, the things that are
centaurs and unicorns are identical, but what TC commits to when
it only assumes centaurs cannot be identical to what TU commits
to when it only assumes unicorns. According to Jubien, “[i]t is in
just this sense that commitment is asserted to be intensional: sub-
stitutivity of codesignative expressions in the second position of the
locution ‘T assumes 𝛼’ fails” (Jubien, 1972, 384).
To sustain that ontological commitment is an intensional notion
can show some incoherence in Quine’s philosophy inasmuch as he
always defended its extensionality. But it is neither an objection to
the idea of ontological commitment nor a criticism of the criterion
itself. It is rather a clarification and a characterization of it. Church,
for example, in his 1958 paper, “Ontological Commitment”, defends
both, the importance of the notion of ontological commitment and
its intensional character. On its importance, he states that “no dis-
cussion of an ontological question [...] can be regarded as intelligi-
ble unless it obeys a definite criterion of ontological commitment.”
(Church, 1958, 1012). And he shows examples from Alfred Ayer,
Gilbert Ryle and Arthur Pap of ontological positions which are inco-
herent and unintelligible precisely because they do not respect any
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notion of ontological commitment. On the intensionality of ontolog-
ical commitments, he restrains itself to a footnote:
I remark in passing that ontological commitment is an inten-
sional notion, in the sense that ontological commitment must
be to a class concept rather than a class. For example, onto-
logical commitment to unicorns is evidently not the same as
ontological commitment to purple cows, even if by chance the
two classes are both empty and therefore identical. (Church,
1958, 1013–1014 (note 3))
The intensionality of the notion of ontological commitment is now
considered a decided question, with Cartwright (1954) and Scheffler
and Chomsky (1958) being the obligatory references. See, for ex-
ample, Jill Humphries (1980, 164), Chateaubriand (2003, 47–49),
Rayo (2007, 432) and Howard Peacock (2011, 89). It is worth notic-
ing that in addition to some unsuccessful attempts to reformulate
the criterion in an explicitly extensional way, Quine himself never
responded directly to these accusations of intensionality.
5 Objections and replies
Over the years, the notion of ontological commitment has played
a prominent role in the analytical tradition of philosophy. To the
same extent, however, that Quinean metaontology has gained recog-
nition and importance, several specific aspects of his criterion have
received criticisms and objections, a few of which will be briefly dis-
cussed in this section. 15
15 A theme so controversial and central to multiple areas of philosophy, with a con-
stant presence in the literature for more than 70 years, surely deserves a less arbi-
trary an incomplete cut than the one done by the few objections here addressed.
Nevertheless, among the objections with which I became aware, I chose to include
those whose treatment I thought would contribute to deepening the understanding
of the notion of ontological commitment and would highlight its connections with
language, semantics, logic and metaphysics.
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5.1 Alston, Searle and the relationship between ontology
and language
A very common type of objection, first made by William Alston
(1958) and then by many others, such as Searle (1969), Michael
Hodges (1972), Frank Jackson (1980), Humphries (1980) and
Hans-Johann Glock (2002) addresses the linguistic and formal as-
pect of Quine’s proposal. These authors consider it is inadmissible
that paraphrase or regimentation can solve substantive ontological
questions. Alston, for instance, analyses several pairs of sentences
where the second one supposedly avoids the ontological commit-
ments of the first, such as:
There is a possibility that James will come. (9)
The statement that James will come is not certainly false. (10)
Then he states:
whether a man admits (asserts) the existence of possibilities
depends on what statement he makes, not on what sentence
he uses to make that statement. [...] It is a question of what
he says, not of how he says it. Hence he cannot repudiate his
admission by simply changing his words. (Alston, 1958, 13)
According to Alston, if (10) says the same as (9), then either both
commit themselves to the existence of possibilities or none commits.
Our ontological commitments should depend only on what we say
and not on how we say it.
Criticisms of this nature, however, are grounded in a false suppo-
sition that ontological reduction via paraphrase and regimentation
demands synonymy. Regimentation in canonical notation requires
choices on how to solve the many ambiguities of natural language
discourse, some of which are related to ontology. (10) and (9) may
not be entirely clear regarding the ontology they assume, but if (9’)
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and (10’) are canonical regimented versions of (9) and (10) respec-
tively and if the truth of (9’) depends on one of its variables having
a possibility as its value while the truth of (10’) does not, then (9’)
and (10’) are not only distinct sentences, they also make different
statements. They are not synonyms. One of them (9’) commits to
the existence of probabilities, while the other (10’) does not. Any on-
tological reduction, like the one from (9’) to (10’) shall be accepted
whenever the ontological entity reduced isn’t essential to the com-
munication intended. It is not the case, as Alston claims, of saying
the same thing in two different ways, but of saying different things.
It is the case of having said more when one could have said less. 16
16 I refrain from presenting (9’) and (10’), the regimented versions of (9) and (10)
in canonical notation, as this would involve making decisions on how to refer to
propositions and sentences in a first-order language, which is a polemical issue that
would divert our attention. This point, however, can be exemplified more easily by
the sentence
Some dogs are white. (11)
presented by Quine (1963b, 113). (11) can be regimented in first-order language
either by
∃x (Dog(x) ∧White(x)) (12)
or by
∃x (∃y (Dogness(y) ∧ ∀z (Dogness(z)→ (y = z)) ∧ x ∈ y)
∧ ∃z (Whiteness(z) ∧ ∀w (Whiteness(w)→ (z = w)) ∧ x ∈ z)) (13)
which is only a version in pure canonical notation, without individual constants, of
sentence
∃x (x ∈ dogness ∧ x ∈ whiteness)
The value of ‘x’, the only variable of (12), required for its truth is an individual
who satisfies the property of being a dog and, also, the property of being white.
But for (13) to be true, the variable ‘y’ must have the very property of dogness as
its value, and the value of ‘z’ must be the property of whiteness. So even though
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Among the other authors who raise this same kind of objection,
Searle (1969) deserves to be highlighted due to his influence and for
having advanced one more step beyond Alston’s criticism.
I want now [...] to attack the whole notion of a purely ob-
jective or notational criterion of ontological commitment by
showing that if we really take it seriously we can show that
any ontological commitment you like is only apparent simply
by paraphrasing it. (Searle, 1969, 109)
Searle then proposes two definitions: 17
‘K’: the conjunction of all scientific knowledge
‘P’: P(x) =df (x = thispen) ∧ K
and presents the following proof: 18
1 K (hypothesis)
2 thispen = thispen (= introduction)
3 (thispen = thispen) ∧ K (∧ introduction in 2 ,1 )
4 P(thispen) (definition of P in 3 )
5 ∃x P(x) (∃ introduction in 4 )
(12) and (13) are regimented versions of the same sentence (11), they are not
synonymous, they do not make the same statement. They make different claims
with different ontological commitments. (13) commits itself to the existence of
properties (formalised extensionally as sets) while (12) does not.
17 Searle ignores that there is no individual constant in Quinean canonical notation
and builds his argument with the help of the name ‘thispen’. This fact, however,
is not an essential issue, because the same argument could be produced without
using names.
18 Searle’s proof and the next one were formalized here in Fitch’s style natural
deduction according to the rules of Jon Barwise et al. (1999, 557).
Draft Version, 2018
. Daniel Durante 29.
Searle claims this proves that the only ontological commitment of
all scientific knowledge is this pen. As his proof depends neither
on the sentences that ‘K’ abbreviates, nor on the reference of the
name ‘thispen’ then, if Searle is right, with this argument we can, as
we wish, either eliminate or assign any ontological commitment to
any theory. This constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the criterion
(Searle, 1969, 110).
At first sight it may seem that Searle is right. After all, an as-
sertion of ‘∃x P(x)’ is an assertion of the conjuntction of all scicen-
tific knowledge (K) together with the affirmation of the existence of
something identical to this pen. Yet, the only value that ‘x’ seems
to have in order to ‘∃x P(x)’ to be true is this pen (the reference of
the name ‘thispen’). Hence, according to Quine’s criterion, ‘∃x P(x)’
seems to commit itself only to this pen. Nevertheless, there is a
glaring fault in Searle’s argument. A way to show it is through the
following proof:
1 ∃x P(x) (hypothesis)
2 ∃x ((x = thispen) ∧ K) (definition of P in 1 )
3 a (a = thispen) ∧ K (supposition)
4 K (∧ elimination in 3 )
5 K (∃ elimination in 2 and 3−4 )
Whoever uses the sentence ‘∃x P(x)’ to assert all the scientific knowl-
edge must hold the definition of ‘P’ Searle gives and, therefore,
also has also to accept the above proof, which points out that ‘K’,
the conjunction of all scientific knowledge, is a logical consequence
of ‘∃x P(x)’. Searle seems to have forgotten that theories rather
than sentences have ontological commitments. Viewed as a theory,
‘∃x P(x)’ will have, besides the ontological commitment to this pen,
which the sentence itself makes explicit, all the ontological commit-
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ments of its logical consequences. Consequently, the above proof
shows that ‘∃x P(x)’ will have the same ontological commitments as
‘K’ and one more, to with this pen. Thus, there is no elimination of
ontological commitment, but only a single and not gratuitous addi-
tion, as ‘∃x P(x)’ says, in fact, more than ‘K’. In addition to stating
the conjunction of all scientific knowledge, it also states that this pen
exists.
A different and less important question is to know what exactly
the ontological commitments of ‘K’ are. Searle (1969, 109) only says
that “ ‘K’ is an abbreviation for (the conjunction of statements which
state) all existing scientific knowledge.” Now if he wants to criticise
Quine’s criterion, then he must show that its use, which demands
regimentation on canonical notation, is in some sense problematic.
Surely there will be obvious difficulties in any attempt of regiment-
ing all scientific knowledge in one single formal theory and in tak-
ing the conjunction of all its axioms. Nonetheless, this is irrelevant
to both Searle’s argument and my criticism of it, because neither
Searle’s attack to Quine’s criterion nor my defence of it relies on ‘K”s
constitution. Independently of what the ontological commitments of
‘K’ are and of how well they represent the ontological commitments
of all scientific knowledge, Searle’s argument would be successful if
he had shown that his construction of ‘∃x P(x)’ cancels all the onto-
logical commitments of ‘K’, replacing them with a single one. We
have seen, nevertheless, that this is not the case. 19
5.2 Rayo and the problem of extrinsic properties
Rayo (2007, 428) defines the truth conditions of a sentence “as de-
mands that the truth of the sentence imposes on the world”, and
defines ontological commitments as a part or aspect of the sentence’s
19 Though faulty, Searle’s objection remains influential. Michael (2008) and Pea-
cock (2011), for instance, ground their rejection of Quine’s criterion on slightly
altered but equally wrong versions of Searle’s argument. For a much more detailed
analysis of Searle’s criticism, see Chateaubriand (1971, 39–47).
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truth conditions. Among the demands that the sentence’s truth im-
poses on the world, the ontological commitments will be those con-
cerned with ontology, with what exists. Given this definition, Rayo
then presents the following objection to Quine’s criterion.
Quine’s criterion can undergenerate when the language con-
tains atomic predicates expressing extrinsic properties. Part of
what is to be a daughter is to have a parent. So, the truth
of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ demands of the world that there be par-
ents. But parents needn’t be counted amongst the values of
the variables in order for ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ to be true. (Rayo,
2007, 431–432)20.
This is a very interesting criticism, bringing up profound issues with
regard metaphysics and its relations with epistemology, semantics
and language. The objection is quite straight. The only entities
needed as values of ‘x’ for the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ are daughters.
Then, according to Quine’s criterion, ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ ontologically
commits to daughters only. Yet, there can be no daughters where
there are no parents. So it may seem that one of the ontological
demands the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ imposes on the world is that
there be parents. Then, given Rayo’s definition, ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ also
commits to the existence of parents and thus has more ontological
commitments than Quine’s criterion can tell.
Let’s begin by noting that the problem of extrinsic properties,
if it affects Quine’s criterion at all, it does so much less often than
may seem at first sight. The main reason for this is that Quine, un-
like Rayo, sees theories, not sentences, as the bearers of ontological
20 Rayo also points out some limitations of Quine’s criterion mainly related to the
narrow expressiveness of canonical notation and formulates some expanded ver-
sions of it applicable to more expressive formal languages, such as one for lan-
guages with plural quantification and another for languages with modal operators
of necessity and possibility. More than criticisms, these proposals are advancements
of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment to broader contexts than its original
focus, which was scientific theories. Yet Rayo himself admits that these expansions
remain susceptible to his objection of extrinsic property (Rayo, 2007, 438)
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commitment. We have already quoted one of the formulations of his
criterion that states it explicitly:
[E]ntities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if
some of them must be counted among the values of the vari-
ables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be
true. (Quine, 1963b, 103) (emphasis mine)
It seems common sense to expect that the more a property (extrinsic
or not) is closely associated with a predicate, the more likely that
property will be explicitly addressed by any reasonable theory deal-
ing with the predicate. As the property of having parents is strongly
associated with the predicate ‘being a daughter’, most of the com-
prehensible theories ontologically committed to daughters, where
‘∃xDaughter(x)’ is one of their sentences, will also be committed to
parents, and will have the sentence ‘∃x Parent(x)’ or some equivalent
form of it as one of their sentences. As a result, most theoretical
contexts that commits us to daughters also commits us to parents,
avoiding the problem of extrinsic properties.
But how strongly associated are daughters and parents? Rayo
simply treats the need of parents for the existence of daughters as a
triviality, but it’s not clear if he treats it as an analytic (conceptual)
or a synthetic (factual) triviality. If it is an analytic triviality, then to
have a parent is part of the very meaning of being a daughter and
for that reason, any theory dealing with daughters but not with par-
ents is not only unreasonable but meaningless. So, in the case that a
predicate is analytically attached to its extrinsic properties, Quine’s
criterion, understood as having theories as the bearers of ontological
commitments, does not suffer from the problem of extrinsic proper-
ties at all. Because no theory dealing with a particular predicate can
be intelligible, meaningful, without also addressing the properties
we recognize as analytically related to it. 21
21 Rayo’s agreement with this interpretation becomes more evident in a later work
(Rayo, 2013), where he developed the idea of the operator “just is” in which the
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Yet what if the main and the extrinsic properties of a predicate
are factually (synthetically) associated? Probably this is not how
Rayo understands the problem, yet as we have already answered the
criticism otherwise, exploration of this angle will give us an oppor-
tunity better to understand the notion of ontological commitment.
Besides, if we accept the arguments Quine gives in “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism”, there is no meaning independent of facts, there is
no analyticity. The border marking where the meaning of ‘daughter’
ends and the facts about daughters begin is not as sharp as it may
seem. Thus, accepting or not Quine’s arguments, there is room for
examining the hypothesis that to have a parent is not part of the
meaning of being a daughter, but it is a fact about daughters. If so,
then it’s possible to have meaningful, though unreasonable, theories
where there are daughters but no parents.
Furthermore, what can we say of less obvious ontological de-
mands the truth of a sentence imposes on the world? One might
argue, for instance, that one of the ontological demands that the
truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ imposes on the world is that the sun ex-
ists. Part of what is to be a daughter is that there is a sun because
without the sun we would die or even not have existed, and there-
fore there would be no daughters. For there to be daughters, there
must be the sun. Even more so, someone could argue that a fun-
damental part of what is to be a daughter is to have grandparents,
since without grandparents there are no parents and without par-
ents there are no daughters. The existence of daughters, then, seems
to demand, in addition to parents, that there be grandparents; but
it seems also to demand that there be couples, at least for a cer-
tain period of time necessary to start the production of daughters;
that there be females, since all daughters are females; that there be
males, because they are still needed to produce daughters; that there
property of being a daughter, given by the predicate ‘Daughter’ could fit according
to the definition: “for there to be a daughter just is to have parents and be a female”.
If this definition is accepted, then having parents is part of the very meaning of what
is a daughter and therefore daughters and parents are analytically related.
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be species, because couples with physiologically very different mem-
bers do not produce daughters; that there be life, because only living
beings can be daughters; and that there be the sun, because without
the sun there would be no life and no daughters.
Between the obviousness of having parents and the strangeness
of being under the sun as demands the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ im-
poses on the world, there is a potentially infinite array of candidates.
How can we deal with all of them? Which ones are reasonable and
which ones are not? The list above is only a tiny sample, and the
knowledge of all such demands would require us to be omniscient.
Nevertheless, despite our lack of omniscience, we can correctly judge
‘∃xDaughter(x)’ as a true sentence, and we also can produce numer-
ous good theories that deal with daughters and connect them with
many of the supposed demands the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ imposes
on the world.
To better address this situation, we must remember that the main
reason why Quine devised the concept of ontological commitment
was to yield a neutral instrument for the ontological debate. Quine
wanted to show that it is possible to meaningfully state that a specific
supposed entity does not exist, without thereby making any commit-
ment to the very entity whose existence is being denied. He wanted
to cut off Plato’s beard (Quine, 1963d, 1-2).
As we have already noted in Section Four (p.22), to fulfil this
role, the notion of ontological commitment must be versatile enough
to make intelligible a statement such as:
A theory T is ontologically committed to Ps,
but Ps do not exist.
(14)
It turns out that for claims like (14) to be intelligible, the ontological
commitments of a theory T cannot be limited to what is in the world
since T can be ontologically committed to what does not exist.
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An extrinsic property of something is one that depends on a
larger whole than the thing itself (Marshall and Weatherson, 2018).
So when Rayo states that ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ ontologically commits to
parents because to have a parent is an extrinsic property of being
a daughter, he is appealing to a larger whole that contains daugh-
ters as a part of it. Under the hypothesis we are analysing that the
need of parents is factually related to the existence of daughters, this
larger whole must be the actual world. Given the way the world is,
there can be no daughters without parents. But then, the notion of
ontological commitment is being subjected to how the world is, to
what exists. Therefore, it cannot provide intelligibility to (14) and
thus becomes irrelevant, unable to fulfil its fundamental role of be-
ing a neutral instrument for the ontological debate.
The demands the truth of a sentence imposes on the world and,
among them, its ontological commitments, cannot represent a sub-
mission of the sentence to the way the world is, but must be an
imposition on the world, a description of how the world should be
for the sentence to be true. If the ontological commitments of a
sentence were subjected to the way the world is, then the sentence
could not commit ontologically to what does not exist, and the no-
tion of ontological commitment would thus lose all its relevance and
functionality.
It is worth noting that this mistake is the same one that Quine
himself made. There is no problem with Rayo’s definition of onto-
logical commitment. It can even be understood as equivalent to that
of Quine. The problem begins when one mistakenly interprets it ex-
tensionally. The ontological demands that the truth of a sentence
imposes on the world should not be sought in the world because
they are not part of it. They correspond to what the world would be
like if the sentence were true. Therefore, they are not things, exten-
sions, but concepts, intensions. After all, being demands, they are
impositions on the way the world needs to be for the sentence to be
true. So, Rayo’s criterion also relies on the notion of necessity and,
as showed in Section Four, is for that reason intensional.
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If they are not in the world, where are the ontological demands?
Where should we look for them? If we turn, for example, to the
above-suggested list of demands that the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’
seems to impose on the world: parents, grandparents, couples, fe-
males, males, biological species, life and the sun; how can we decide
which ones are reasonable and which ones are not?
Quine himself indicated the answer, though he did not respect
his own statement. As we have already mentioned (p.22), an on-
tological commitment is “checking not on existence, but on imputa-
tions of existence: on what a theory says exist” (Quine, 1969a, 93).
Being intensional and conceptual, the demands that the truth of a
sentence imposes on the world are not factual but theoretical. We
must, therefore, look for them in the theories we hold. Hence, the
only boundary between what is and what is not reasonable to count
as a demand that the truth of A imposes on the world must be given
by some theory of which A is one of the sentences. It doesn’t matter
if, given the way the world is, there can be no daughters without
there being parents. It will be reasonable to consider the existence
of parents as a demand the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ imposes on the
world only if we accept a theory T which states the existence of both
daughters and parents.
The most common way to understand a theory is through a lin-
guistic characterisation. Given a finite set T of axioms, a theory will
be its deductive closure, that is, the set of all sentences B such that
T  B. Then we could say that given a sentence A of some theory T
(where T  A) the reasonable demands that the truth of A imposes
on the world are precisely all other sentences of T, that is, all sen-
tences B such that T  B. Among these demands, the ontological
commitments will be the existential affirmations, sentences with the
form ‘∃x F(x)’ such that T  ∃x F(x). And this is exactly the alter-
native formulation of Quine’s criterion presented in Section Three
(p.13).
But there is also a model-theoretical way of characterising a the-
ory. A model for a set T of sentences is an interpretation of the
Draft Version, 2018
. Daniel Durante 37.
vocabulary in T that renders true all sentences of T. In a model-
theoretic reading, the notation ‘T  A’ means that all models of T
are also models of A. It means that all interpretations in which all
sentences of T are true also render A true. An arbitrary model for T
may render true more sentences than T’s deductive closure (the As
such that T  A) and for that reason does not characterise T. Now
let M be the intersection of all models of T. It’s clear that M ren-
ders true all and only the sentences A such that T  A, and hence it
does characterise the theory T, being its minimal model. M has no
leftovers. We cannot take anything out of it, under the penalty of
rendering false some sentence of T. All elements ofM’s domain are,
then, entities that must be among the values of the variables of the
sentences of T for them to be true. And this is exactly the original
formulation of Quine’s criterion.22
In a linguistic characterisation, a theory is a set of sentences,
the deductive closure of a finite set T of axioms, and the ontolog-
ical commitments are the existential affirmations in it. Then, un-
der such a linguistic characterisation, to say that T is ontologically
committed to daughters is just a more informal way of saying that
T  ∃xDaughter(x). Whereas in a model-theoretic characterisation,
a theory is the intersection of all models of T, its minimal modelM.
All demands that the truth of T’s sentences imposes on the world
are given by the several attributes of M. In particular, the onto-
logical commitments of T are the elements in M’s domain. When
T  ∃xDaughter(x), some of the elements of M’s domain, the ones
in the extension of ‘Daughter’, are required to make the sentence
‘∃xDaughter(x)’ true. Others are not, but they are in M’s domain
22 Model-theoretic interpretations are merely formal devices, so that the nature of
the elements of their domains has no interference over which sentences will be
true and which will be false. Two isomorphic models, for which there is a bijection
between their domains that preserves the extensions of predicates and relations
are, for all semantic effects, the same model. We can then consider without any
loss that the minimal model’s domain is obtained by the intersection of bijections
of all models’ domains of a theory T which are sets of elements of the same nature,
such as cardinal numbers, for example.
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because they are required to render others sentences of T true and
correspond to the ontological demands of the extrinsic properties of
‘Daughter’, that are given by T.
We cannot forget, however, as Quine unfortunately did, that
there are no daughters in the extension of ‘Daughter’. The elements
of the minimal model’s domain, the ontological commitments, are
not that part of the world to which the predicates and relations of
the language refer when literally interpreted. They are not the things
themselves, the daughters, but just conceptual representations of
them that do not depend on how the world is. It is precisely for this
reason that we say that the ontological commitments are not factual,
but theoretical. They are not extensional things of the actual world,
but intensional concepts that belong to a model-theoretic character-
isation of a theory. 23
These two different ways of characterising theories help us to
see both that the two versions of Quine’s criterion are equivalent,
as much as that both are also equivalent to Rayo’s definition, which
was made in terms of truth conditions. Still, we can ask ourselves.
Why are the demands that the truth of a sentence imposes on the
world theoretical rather than a factual matter? How can the truth
conditions of a sentence be independent of the actual world? Isn’t
the world itself and the way it is the best arbiter to establish the truth
conditions of a sentence? These are delicate questions whose proper
treatment would require a depth and extension incompatible with
this text. Below there is but a brief indication of what is involved in
the answer.
A banal though fundamental fact, which often goes unnoticed, is
that sentences are not always true. They can also be false. But what
does it mean to say that a sentence A is false? In Rayo’s terms, it
means to say that the world does not supply the demands that A’s
truth imposes upon it. But then, to recognise that a sentence A is
false, we must be able to know how the world would be if it were
23 See note 14 (p.21)
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true and find that it is not so. Therefore, the way the world would
be, if sentence A were true, must be available to us in a way that
is independent of the way the world is, so that we can make the
comparison and verify the truth or falsity of the sentence.
This availability regardless of how the world is requires the no-
tion of meaning or sense. The terms present in a sentence A, besides
being able to have a reference in the world, also have a meaning
or sense. The complete sentence also has a sense that can be un-
derstood as what we are calling the way the world would be if the
sentence were true, and which Rayo called the demands that the truth
of the sentence imposes on the world, its truth conditions. So, the
sentence’s truth conditions, its sense, does not depend on the world.
For if it so depended, we would be unable to identify false sentences.
And if it does not depend on the world, the sense must be given by
what is present in the sentence. Therefore, the sense attached to a
sentence is limited to its vocabulary. The sense of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’,
for example, cannot involve more than daughters.
But how then do we relate daughters to parents, grandparents,
couples, biological species, females, males, life, and the sun? We
do this through our theories. Whether interpreted linguistically or
model-theoretically, theories contain related sentences, and so they
relate different senses. In doing so, they express more detailed and
complete images of how the world would be if all their sentences
were true. Different theories about daughters will include different
elements and will make different connections. Some of them would
involve only daughters. Others, more commonly, will include par-
ents, grandparents, couples, and some could even include the sun.
What will give the limits to what is and what is not among the de-
mands the truth of ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ imposes on the world are, then,
the theories of which ‘∃xDaughter(x)’ is a sentence.
Summing up, Rayo missed the point when he changed the bearer
of ontological commitments from theories to sentences, and we kept
wrong when tried to save his criticism throughout an extensional
understanding of his definition, looking for the ontological commit-
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ments in the actual world. Quine’s criterion of ontological commit-
ment does not suffer any problem of extrinsic properties just because
the truth conditions of a sentence, the demands its truth imposes on
the world, are not facts of the world, but conceptual senses enclosed
in the sentence and in some theory containing it.
5.3 Azzouni and the alternative predicates of existence
Another type of objection to Quine’s criterion that is worth dealing
with is the alleged absence of standards for judging alternative on-
tological commitment criteria when they are based on alternative
concepts of existence. Interested in defending a deflationary posi-
tion that considers questions about ontology as philosophically in-
determinate, especially in philosophy of mathematics, Jody Azzouni
(1998) presents a critique of the debate on the Quine-Putnam indis-
pensability thesis, which states that “if one’s best scientific (physical)
theory requires existential quantification over certain entities, the
one is ontologicallly committed to such entities” (Azzouni, 1998, 1).
As our best scientific theories require existential quantification
over various mathematical entities, then by endorsing such theories
we ontologically commit to these entities. The thesis of indispens-
ability is based both on the notion of ontological commitment and
on Quine’s very criterion since it assumes that any theory we stand
ontologically commits us as well as that these ontological commit-
ments express themselves in existential quantifications.
Azzouni, as we did in the Introduction, also considers that dis-
tinct concepts of existence, which he calls criteria for what ex-
ists (CWE) demand different criteria of ontological commitment,
which he calls criteria for recognising what a discourse commits us to
(CRD). Among examples of alternative CWEs are concreteness, space-
temporality, causal efficacy, sensory constituency, or whatever we take
as the hallmark of existence. Different metaphysical conceptions on
what it means to exist will give different CWEs.
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Azzouni, then, states that Quine did not give any CWE, but only
a CRD. He also says that even if we accept the first-order canonical
regimentation Quine requires, we still can question the role that the
existential quantifier plays as the formal resource responsible for at-
tributing ontological commitment to the values of variables. We can,
instead, use the alternative CWE we favour to create a predicate
of existence, such as ‘Concrete’ or ‘CausallyEffective’ and give to this
predicate the responsibility of attributing ontological commitment
to the values of variables. Existence, then, would cease to be what
existential quantifier expresses and would become what the chosen
predicate of existence expresses. To do this is to change the very
criterion of ontological commitment.
According to Azzouni, alternative criteria of ontological commit-
ment so constructed would be as legitimate as Quine’s criterion, be-
cause there would be no rational ground for deciding among rival
criteria. Each one would be equally adequate for pointing out the on-
tological commitments given by the concept of existence from which
it originates. Therefore, the thesis of indispensability would lose its
strength, because even there being an agreement on which are our
best scientific theories, different criteria of ontological commitment,
built according to distinct concepts of existence, would point out dis-
tinct entities as indispensable. Where there is no accordance on what
it means to exist, also there is no agreement on what is indispensable
to exist.
There is, however, an asymmetry between the logical role of
quantifiers and the role of predicates which helps us to realize that
Azzouni is wrong when he claims that there are as good reasons
to justify Quine’s criterion as to justify any other one based upon a
predicate of existence. This asymmetry consists of the fact that the
first-order quantifiers (∃ and ∀) legislate on first-order predicates
and relations, and on the entities that can satisfy them by imposing
obligations and prohibitions.
Suppose, for example, I adopt the doctrine that equates being to
causal efficacy and take the predicate ‘CausallyEffective’ as a predi-
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cate of existence. Then, paraphrasing Quine, I affirm that existence
is what the predicate ‘CausallyEffective’ expresses, that an entity x ex-
ists if and only if CausallyEffective(x). If I also adopt canonical nota-
tion and classical logic as formal resources to deal with my theories,
then I will be forced to accept constraints imposed on everything that
exists, independently of any considerations on causal efficacy. These
constraints are obligations and prohibitions imposed by the quanti-
fiers and their logical rules, and no predicate (of existence or not)
can interfere with them. If I, for example, consider that ‘god’ exists,
precisely by judging that ‘CausallyEffective(god)’ is true, then, given
any property ‘F’, ‘god’ and any entity I consider exists is obliged to sat-
isfy or not satisfy ‘F’. This obligation is in effect for ‘god’ regardless
of any considerations we make about its causal efficacy. It is in effect
for ‘god’ and for everything else simply because ‘∀x (F(x) ∨ ¬F(x))’ is
a logical truth. And there are not only obligations, but also prohi-
bitions which are imposed on ‘god’, upon which no consideration of
his causal efficacy will have the slightest influence. It is forbidden
to ‘god’ satisfying and not satisfying a property ‘F’ simply because
‘¬∃x (F(x) ∧ ¬F(x))’ is also a logical truth.
To give a somewhat less obvious example, I once heard a lec-
ture by Nathan Salmon in which he demonstrated that the barber
from the barber’s paradox, the one who shaves all and only those
who do not shave themselves, does not exist. And he did not come
to this conclusion by any consideration on causal efficacy. He came
to it simply by noting that the sentence ‘¬∃x ∀y (R(x,y)↔ ¬R(y,y))’
is a logical truth which he called Russell’s law. Then, the sen-
tence ‘¬∃x ∀y (Shaves(x,y)↔ ¬Shaves(y,y))’, which asserts the non-
existence of such a barber and is an instance of Russell’s law, is also
a classical first-order theorem. There is no barber’s paradox because
this sentence that denies the existence of the paradoxical barber, the
one who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves, is
a theorem of logic. This well illustrates how existence is under the
jurisdiction of quantificational theorems of logic despite of all other
considerations.
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Quantifiers impose obligations and prohibitions that regulate ex-
istence in a way that escapes any concept of existence that has been
formalised as a predicate. The divergence in the way that classical
and constructivist mathematicians conceive the existence of mathe-
matical entities, for example, demanded of the latter more than an
alternative predicate of existence. It required an alternative logic,
the intuitionistic logic, which is rebellious and does not accept,
among others, the obligation expressed by ‘∀x (F(x) ∨ ¬F(x))’. The
mode of being of the entities of constructivist mathematics is differ-
ent from the mode of being of the entities of classical mathematics
simply because their quantifiers are different and obey different log-
ical rules. In the following passage Quine is quite explicit in this
regard:
The intuitionist has a different doctrine of being from mine,
as he has a different quantification theory; and that I am sim-
ply at odds with the intuitionist on the one as on the other.
(Quine, 1969a, 108)24
Church also holds a similar point of view:
[T]hose philosophers who speak of “existence”, “reality”, and
the like are to be understood as meaning the existential quan-
tifier [...] The justification is that no other reasonable meaning
of “existence” has ever been provided. (Church, 1958, 1014)
The moral of the story is that if Azzouni wants to propose alter-
native criteria of ontological commitment based on alternative con-
cepts of existence, it is not enough to introduce new predicates of
existence. He needs alternative logics. It is necessary to present the
logical behaviour of these concepts of existence, that is, to translate
them into coherent logical rules expressing the restrictions, obliga-
tions and prohibitions that these conceptions of existence impose on
24 See also quote from p. 15 (Quine, 1969a, 112–113).
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beings. Azzouni errs when he says that Quine did not offer a crite-
rion for what exists (CWE). He did propose one. It is his referential
doctrine of being, for which there is no better characterisation than
the restrictions that the quantificational theorems of classical logic
impose on everything that exists. Any alternative CWE which rejects
some aspect of Quine’s referential doctrine of being must also reject
some aspect of the logic it favours. And we can disagree with Quine
in many ways. Intuitionistic logic is just one of them. There are
modal logics, second-order logic, free logics, relevant logics, para-
consistent logics, and so on. Whenever we choose to use a deviant
logic instead of the classical one, we are not only changing our stan-
dard of inference but also adopting a different CWE and a different
doctrine of being.
All these possibilities, far from deflating ontology, as Azzouni
wanted, represent on the contrary the recognition of its fundamental
importance. After all, if different doctrines of being demand differ-
ent theories of quantification and different logics, then our decisions
on what it means to exist will influence all other issues we reason
about. If instead of just a single predicate of existence, different
CWEs were related to distinct logics, then the standard to decide
among the alternative concepts of existence and indispensable enti-
ties, which Azzouni judged to be non-existent, would be available. It
would be provided by a comparison of how the divergent approaches
to logical validity given by those distinct logics are adequate to facts
and our discourses.
6 Quantification, extensionality and naturalism
I would like to conclude this article reflecting with some of the most
controversial aspects of Quine’s approach to ontological commit-
ments, seeking to clarify specific points that help the understanding
of a few of his polemical positions.
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Two of the most fundamental Quinean meta-ontological theses,
which according to Van Inwagen (2009), became methodological
foundations of an entire tradition, state that:
Existence is univocal. (15)
The single sense of existence is adequately
captured by the existential quantifier.
(16)
Now, if existence is univocal, then there are no different ways of
being. Anything that exists does it in precisely the same sense as
anything else. If, furthermore, the logical quantifiers capture this
unique sense of existence, then there is a single and unrestricted
domain of quantification which encompasses everything there is. If
numbers, stones, and attributes exist, then a single variable ‘x’ may
assume values among numbers, stones, and attributes. There are no
multiple types of variables, but only one. Then theses (15) and (16)
lead us to the following thesis:
There is a single unrestricted domain of
quantification that covers everything there is.
(17)
The admission a single unrestricted domain of quantification helps
to explain the simplicity of the motto ‘to be is to be the value of a vari-
able’, but it also demands from Quine to be careful about what may
be among these values, that is, about what may exist. One of Quine’s
most widely criticised positions is his insistence on first-order logic
as the system in which theories must be regimented for the evalu-
ation of their ontological commitments. Why not use second-order
logic? Why not also allow quantification on predicates and relations
and thereby broaden the possibilities of what can exist? This alter-
native, however, is not open to Quine. It is incompatible with his
admission of a single unrestricted domain of quantification, for if he
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admits second order, that is, that there can be quantification over
predicates and relations, then he obtains at once Russell’s paradox.
As Michael Potter (2004, 300) well points out, there are only two
ways of avoiding Russell’s paradox in second-order logic: either by
abandoning thesis (17), or by accommodating second-order quan-
tification in an intensional context where there can be predicates
‘G’ and ‘F’ that are true of the same individuals, but which are not
numerically identical: ∃G∃F ((G ̸= F) ∧ ∀x (F(x)↔ G(x)).25
These are concessions Quine is not willing to make, as they are
incompatible with fundamental beliefs that underlie his whole philo-
sophical project. Abandoning the uniqueness and absolute general-
ity of the domain of quantification (17) requires the abdication of
some of its most fundamental meta-ontological theses: either the
univocity of existence (15) or its translatability in the classical exis-
tential quantification (16). After all, “[e]xistence is what existential
quantification expresses. There are things of kind F if and only if
∃x F(x) (Quine, 1969a, 97).
To abandon extensionality is to give up what Quine takes to
be the minimum requirement for the acceptance of any entity, its
standard of ontological admissibility, which is founded on the prin-
ciples of identity (substitution of identicals and identity of indis-
cernibles). The most obvious clue that an alleged entity does not
exist presents itself for Quine when its semantic interpretation re-
quires intensional contexts in which the principle of substitution of
identicals fails (Quine, 1969c, 23). Similarly, one of Quine’s admit-
ted ways of reifying a concept is to transform a similarity relation
25 The admission of a single unrestricted domain of quantification was also the main
reason that led Quine mistakenly to treat ontological commitments extensionally, as
we have seen in Section 5.2. If the universal set is the only domain of quantification,
then the domains of all models for a theory must be the universal set and so are
constrained by what exists. Then the entities that “must be counted among the
values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true”
(the ontological commitments) must be extensional things in the world.
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into identity, thereby assuming as identical what the relation consid-
ers indiscernible (Quine, 1963b, 117).
[W]hat sense can be found in talking of entities which can-
not meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and
distinct from one another? (Quine, 1963d, 4)
I am a confirmed extensionalist. Extensionalism is a policy I
have clung to through thick, thin, and nearly seven decades of
logicizing and philosophizing. (Quine, 2008, 215)
Quine’s choice to avoid Russell’s paradox is, therefore, to keep with
first-order classical logic, and to abdicate both second-order and in-
tensional contexts. But this does not mean assuming a nominalistic
position that denies existence to all abstract entities. Quine is not a
nominalist. He accepts and even argues in favour of the inevitability
of some abstract entities (Quine, 1963b, 115).
My extensionalist scruples decidedly outweigh my nominalis-
tic ones. (Quine, 1998, 397)
Nevertheless, our theories will only commit to abstract entities when
such entities are explicitly regimented as classes (extensions) in set
theory. In “Logic and The Reification of Universals”, Quine (1963b,
113) states that when we say that some dogs are white,
∃x (Dog(x) ∧White(x))
we do not commit to abstract entities such as dogness or whiteness.
But if we want to, we can make such commitments when we explic-
itly state that
∃x (x ∈ dogness ∧ x ∈ whiteness) 26
26 I use ‘dogness’ as the name of the class of all dogs and ‘whiteness’ as the name
of the class of all white things only to abbreviate the formalization in canonical
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So regimented, the abstract entities admissible for Quine are con-
strained by his alternative set theory NF (New Foundations for Math-
ematical Logic) (Quine, 1963c). While it maintains abstract entities
both extensional and protected from paradoxes, NF accepts the uni-
versal set and therefore is compatible with the unrestricted quantifi-
cation, which is so precious to Quine. 27
These facts help us to understand another much-criticised claim
of Quine, his insistence on the defence of the extensional character
of ontological commitments. I have here presented the intension-
ality of ontological commitments only as a characterisation of this
notion. Yet, as Quine has always defended its extensionality, this
feature is cited in the literature as an objection, perhaps the main
one, because it focuses on a particularly sensitive point for Quine:
his vehement rejection of the concepts of intension, synonymy, ana-
lyticity and other connected notions to the theory of meaning.
If, as we have seen, the formal methods that Quine accepts for
regimentation of theories block the occurrence of intensional con-
texts, and if the ontological commitments of a theory are certain val-
ues of its variables, those indispensable to the truth of the statements
notation which, by requiring the elimination of names and their replacement by
descriptions, would have the following less elegant form:
∃x (∃y (Dogness(y) ∧ ∀z (Dogness(z)→ (y = z)) ∧ x ∈ y)
∧ ∃z (Whiteness(z) ∧ ∀w (Whiteness(w)→ (z = w)) ∧ x ∈ z))
There are ontological commitments to the dog’s and white stuff’s classes because
these classes are the values of the variables ‘y’ and ‘z’ required to make the sen-
tence true. It should be noted that ‘Dog’ is the predicate satisfied by all and only
the dogs and ‘Dogness’ is the predicate satisfied by only one entity, the class of
all dogs, while ‘dogness’ is the name of the set that satisfies ‘Dogness’. That is,
∃y (Dogness(y) ∧ ∀x (Dog(x)↔ x ∈ y) ∧ y = dogness). The same distinction occurs
with ‘White’, ‘Whiteness’ and ‘whiteness’. See also note 16 (p.28).
27 The formalised set theory most commonly used is the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory
(ZF or ZFC - with or without the axiom of choice). This theory, however, would
not serve Quine’s purposes because its methods to avoid Russell’s paradox prevent
the admission of the universal set and, for that reason, imposes restrictions on the
domains of quantification, being incompatible with thesis (17).
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of the theory, then, as much as the values of variables, ontological
commitments should also be protected from intensionality. It was
probably this trivial reasoning that led Quine to state without any
further argumentation that “the question of the ontology of a theory
is a question purely of the theory of reference” (Quine, 1951, 15).
But the talk of values of variables of a theory is a local matter, it
only concerns the own theory and does not need to be relativised.
To this extent, Quine’s formal precautions will protect them from in-
tensionality. In contrast, the talk of ontological commitments, as we
have already seen in Section Four, occurs in the ontological debate,
where a debater must be able to say that a particular theory, with
which he disagrees, assumes ontological commitments to entities
that do not exist (affirmation (14)). So, for that such an assertion to
be intelligible, and hence ontological commitments fulfil their func-
tion as neutral instruments of the ontological debate, they cannot
be extensional things that are in the world, but must be intensional
concepts, which do not depend on how the world is. Therefore, even
though the formal resources we use in regimentation ensure that the
ontologies of all theories we admit are extensional, the notion of on-
tological commitment will not be.
The rejection of the notions related to the theory of meaning and
of everything that requires intensional contexts can also be under-
stood as a commitment of Quine to the theses (15), (16) and (17).
Any formal treatment of intensional contexts will require one of the
following alternatives: (a) an explicitly higher-order logic (second or
major) and, together with it, the separation of variables in types and,
because of that, the separation of distinct domains of quantification
necessary to avoid Russell’s paradox and that violate thesis (17); or
(b) the admission of modes of existence more subtle and distinct
from the actual entities, necessary to accommodate the possibilia,
non-actually existent entities which are elements of other possible
worlds domains, and which violates the thesis (15). Both alterna-
tives violate the univocity of existence and are therefore inadmissible
for Quine.
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To the point, why does Quine so fundamentally support the thesis
of the univocity of existence? Why not allow for alternative modes
of existence that can be captured in multiple domains of quantifi-
cation? It would be enough to accept this possibility to be able to
accommodate intensional contexts as well as to use logics of a su-
perior order. This mitigation not only would soften somewhat the
austerity of his canonical notation’s demands but also would divest
him of various criticisms and objections.
A possible answer lies in his philosophical naturalism. Quine
calls himself a naturalist, meaning primarily that he sees no essential
distinction between philosophy and science. Philosophy does not
legislate nor regulate science, but collaborates with it.
[I]t is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy,
that reality is to be identified and described. (Quine, 1981a,
21)
The philosopher’s task differs from the others’, then, in detail;
but in no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for
the philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme
that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. (Quine,
1960, 275)
We can understand a violation of theses (15), (16) and (17) as
direct opposition to his naturalistic stance. The admission of dif-
ferent modes of being that could be approached by distinct types
of variables confined to diverse sorts of quantifiers, which would
therefore not be absolutely generic, opens space for a fundamental
separation of philosophy from the rest of science. While to science
would fit the sense of being linked to individuals, to actuality and
to extensional abstractions, philosophy should deal with the sense
of being linked to intensional contexts, to meanings, to non-actual
universes. The incommunicability between the domains of quantifi-
cation would protect and isolate philosophy in a supposed “cosmic
exile”. The domain of intensional beings, for example, would be un-
touchable by recalcitrant empirical observations and would require
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another mode of thinking, another conceptual scheme which, ac-
cording to Quine’s naturalism, is inadmissible.
Quine never responded directly to the accusations of intensional-
ity of his ontological commitment criterion, nor did he ever explicitly
abandon the notion, but after the late 1960s, he practically did not
address the subject, except in passing in Quine (1981b). Along with
this ostracism, Quine proposed two fundamental ontology-related
theses: the thesis of ontological relativity, and the thesis of the in-
scrutability of reference. Although these theses are not incompatible
with the notion of ontological commitment, methodologically they
are opposed to it. While the ontological commitments present them-
selves as an instrument for the resolution of ontological debates,
the theses of ontological relativity and inscrutability of reference are
proposed as a lenitive for the impossibility of solving such disputes.
It does not seem, therefore, excessive to say that Quine’s refusal
to accept intensional contexts, motivated by his naturalism and his
commitment to theses (15), (16) and (17), took him from ontologi-
cal commitment to “ontological indifference” (Gibson Jr., 1998, 681).
We could also accuse him of removing from the scope of philosoph-
ical considerations legitimate questions that not only should philos-
ophy deal with, but has in fact dealt with throughout history. After
all, we conceptualize and mean. And not only that, but we also think,
allow, judge, conceive, admit, assume and so many other things that
lead us to the intensional contexts.
Quine’s reply is almost impolite. It is again an austere compro-
mise with naturalism, which reminds us that, despite having out-
grown the ideas of logical positivists in many respects, he maintains
for himself the same philosophical project that motivated the inves-
tigations of his professor Rudolf Carnap and other members of the
Vienna Circle:
if certain problems of ontology, say, or modality, or causality,
or contrary-to-fact conditionals, which arise in ordinary lan-
guage, turn out not to arise in science as reconstituted with the
help of formal logic, then those philosophical problems have
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in an important sense been solved: they have been shown not
to be implicated in any necessary foundation of science.[...]
Philosophy of science is philosophy enough. (Quine, 1953,
446) 28
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